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Discussion
There was considerable disagreement among the American participants concerning the degree to which the Executive Branch has
supported most-favored-nation treatment for imports from the Soviet
Union at various times since the late 1940's. There was universal
agreement, however, that most-favored-nation treatment had been
withdrawn from the Soviet Union on the initiative of Congress and
that Congressional opposition was the primary obstacle to renewal of
most-favored-nation treatment in the early 1970's. It was also generally agreed that this state of affairs was caused by the linkage of trade
policy with general foreign policy considerations in the minds of U.S.
policy makers.
Mr. Metzger expressed the opinion that the linkage of trade policy with general foreign policy considerations was so close that it was
useless to expect Congress to extend most-favored-nation treatment
to the Soviet Union in the absence of significant improvement in the
general political climate. However, he was also of the opinion that the
obstacles which would be removed by most-favored-nation treatment
of Soviet imports were not serious barriers to Soviet-American trade.
Parenthetically, he expressed the opinion that Soviet exporters could
manipulate their prices to overcome the effect of tariff barriers. In
addition, he felt that the key to the future development of SovietAmerican trade was the extension of U.S. government credits for
exports to the Soviet Union. Since such credits were controlled by the
Administration, and thus beyond the influence of a hostile Congress
or public opinion, and since the business community generally favored extension of trade with the Soviet Union, trade would increase
even without most-favored-nation treatment.
Another American participant agreed that the presence or absence of most-favored-nation treatment was not objectively a major
factor, but stated that it was nevertheless a major psychological problem. However, still another American participant contended that
there is no way of knowing the extent to which Soviet producers could
compete for U.S. imports if discriminatory tariff barriers were removed.
There was also strong disagreement among the American participants concerning the extent to which "liberals" in the United States
are to blame for failure to work actively to change public attitudes
toward trade with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Usenko agreed with Mr. Metzger that a favorable rate of
interest on credits for U.S. exports is the most rational way of expanding Soviet-American trade. However, he disagreed with the contention that most-favored-nation treatment is not an important fac-
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tor in such trade. First, he pointed out, Soviet manufacturing enterprises are autonomous units operating under principles of economic
accountability, and thus cannot manipulate their prices to overcome
high tariff barriers. Second, the tariff discrimination involved in a
denial of most-favored-nation treatment has had a material effect on
Soviet exports. Mr. Usenko pointed out examples involving airplanes,
electric generators, and fibers in which the applicable tariff rates
range from thirty to forty percent, as opposed to six to seven percent
for imports from countries enjoying most-favored-nation status. The
result, he noted, is a qualitative as well as a quantitative distortion
in trade patterns; only one-third of the Soviet exports to the United
States are finished products while two-thirds consist of raw materials.
This guarantees a balance of trade which will always be strongly in
favor of the United States, and poses problems to future development. Moreover, Mr. Usenko stated, international trade is best
served not by special favors, but by the uniform application of the
non -discriminatory most-favored-nation standard, which, he felt,
had become an international customary norm.
Mr. Metzger disagreed with Mr. Usenko's contention that there
is an international customary norm requiring the establishment of
most-favored-nation or any other non-discriminatory tariff regime.
He contended that a country is free to discriminate or not, as it
wishes, without violating any international agreement. Further, he
noted, the use of the term "equitable treatment" in the 1972 SovietAmerican Trade Agreement indicates that the two governments contemplated disparity of treatment among goods of various countries,
at least in the case of quantitative restrictions on imports.
Mr. Usenko agreed that most-favored-nation treatment is not
a requirement of international law. However, he said, nondiscrimination is a requirement of international law, and therefore
discriminatory refusal to grant most-favored-nation treatment is a
violation of international law. Further, he stated, the term "equitable
treatment" does not mean in the Soviet text of the Soviet-American
Trade Agreement what Mr. Metzger asserted that it means in the
U.S. text. The meaning assigned to the term by Mr. Metzger would
be meaningless, since the Soviet Union does not have quantitative
restrictions on imports. To the Soviet Union, the term "equitable
treatment" signifies that the goods of each party will receive fair, that
is, non-discriminatory, treatment by the other.
Further discussion disclosed that there is a significant difference
between the Russian and English meanings of the word "equitable."
It was also suggested by an American participant that, in the
eyes of Soviet jurists, as well as of jurists from many other countries,
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but not of the United States, widespread application of a practice
transforms it into a customary norm of international law. Still another American participant suggested that the basic concept from
which the Soviet jurists start is that a "right to trade" exists in
international law.
Mr. Usenko reiterated that non-discrimination is an established
norm of international law, and he cited various authorities, including
statements of the International Law Commission, for this conclusion.

